We characterize screening for collusion as a problem of inference whose essential elements include competitive null hypothesis (H0), a collusive alternative (H1), and an empirical indicator (X) to differentiate between them. Using this framework, we review the theoretical and empirical efforts to design screens and find that screens fail for one of three reasons: (i) the empirical indicator cannot distinguish between H0 and H1; (ii) H0 is not indicative of competition or H1 is not indicative of collusion; or (iii) the world is neither H0 nor H1. The often under-appreciated, second and third conditions imply that before using a screen, the practitioners should make sure that the industry in question "fits" the theoretical model or assumptions on which the screen is based.
Introduction
In 1993, in the course of doing other research, Bill Christie and Paul Schultz noticed that market makers were avoiding odd-eighth quotes on some of the most heavily traded NASDAQ stocks. They tested and rejected a number of cost-based explanations for the practice, and concluded that it was the result of collusion. The obvious benefit of odd-eighth avoidance is that it raises the bid-ask spread, a measure of the "price" that market makers charge for selling and buying stocks, to at least $0.25, over the regulatory minimum of $0.125. At the time, the cost of trading stocks on NASDAQ was about twice the cost of trading stocks on the NYSE, which used a more competitive auction-like mechanism (Morgenson, 1993) .
When the Los Angeles Times reported on the research, the NASDAQ market makers suddenly (within a day) stopped avoiding odd-eighth quotes, and the bid-ask spread on many stocks was cut in half. Professors Christie, Schultz, Harris (1994) then published a companion piece titled "Why did NASDAQ market makers stop avoiding odd eighth quotes?" which reached the same conclusion as the original article. Together, the two papers lead to a raft of private suits and investigations by the US Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Although not originally designed as such, their research is arguably one of the most successful collusive screens ever, and settlements to the antitrust suits have changed the way that NASDAQ market makers trade stocks.
On October 12, 2012, US Representative Edward Markey wrote a letter to the Chairman of the U.S. Federal Trade Commision (FTC) asking him to investigate whether oil companies and refiners were "manipulating" gasoline prices in New England.
2 His request was triggered by the observation that while oil prices had been falling, gasoline prices had not fallen by as much. Partially in response to these kinds of requests, a decade ago, the FTC began regularly screening gasoline prices for collusion. Although the screening has yet to uncover any conspiracies, screening seems to be catching on, as countries like Brazil and Mexico have started similar programs (Levenstein and Suslow, 2013; and Harrington, 2008) . The question motivating this paper is "how well do screens for collusion work?" It is hard to answer by looking at successful follow-on prosecutions. If a screen finds no collusion, it could be that the screen is not working or that there is no collusion to be found.
If a screen does find collusion, one has to look carefully at the resolution of the legal process to determine exactly what happened. Even the NASDAQ market makers never admitted colluding, and there is some uncertainty as to how the conspiracy actually worked. Despite evidence of explicit communication, there were weak incentives for market makers to offer better quotes (even without colluding) because better quotes did not necessarily capture more order flow (Morgenson, 1993) . Perhaps because of this uncertainty, the Department of Justice chose to file a civil antitrust suit, which has a lower burden of proof, rather than a criminal one.
So rather than looking at follow-on prosecutions, we address the issue by modeling screening as a problem of inference whose essential elements include a competitive null hypothesis, a collusive alternative, and an empirical indicator to differentiate between them. For example, were implicitly using a screen based on a null hypothesis that costs were determining prices, a collusive alternative that odd-eighth avoidance was increasing the "price" of trading, and a variety of empirical indicators to rule out cost-based explanations and to show that odd-eighth avoidance was increasing price.
Likewise, Representative Markey was implicitly using a screen based on the null hypothesis that competitive behavior results in a higher pass-through rate from wholesale cost to retail price, the collusive alternative that cartels have a lower pass-through rate, and estimated pass-through rates from oil prices to retail gasoline prices as an empirical indicator to differentiate between the two. Broken down into these elements, it becomes easy to critique his screen. In this case, Congressman Markey's hypothesis that collusion has lowered pass-through rates is at odds with simple models of price-setting behavior (Yde and Vita, 1996; Froeb et al., 2005) . If these models characterize behavior in the gasoline industry, then the screen is likely to be a poor indicator of collusion.
In this paper, we use the taxonomy to better understand the conditions under which screens are likely to succeed or fail. The first is that the empirical indicator may be too "weak" to differentiate between H0 and H1, e.g., Kovacic et al. (2011) .
The second is that the null hypothesis is not indicative of competition or that the alternative is not indicative of collusion. For example, Representative Markey's implicit screen may work in some theoretical models, or may characterize some actual cases of collusion. But absent evidence that the collusion or competition take the assumed forms, the screen's conclusions will be noisy indicators of collusion, at best. We call this the problem of "model fit."
The third reason that a screen may fail is that the world is neither H0 nor H1. In this case, differentiating between H0 and H1 is not useful if the world is really H2. This third criticism is similar to the second and stems from the same issue of model fit. Before using a screen to differentiate between collusion (H0) vs. competition (H1), it is important to try to rule out the existence of H2. This idea is illustrated by the NASDAQ screen. and Christie, Harris, and Schultz (1994) rule out several different cost-based explanations for odd-eighth avoidance, like adverse selection (informed traders are more likely to trade at favorable quotes) and the cost of holding inventory until an order arrives. Essentially, they reject a variety of hypotheses in favor of H1. 3 In what follows, we formally draw the analogy between screening and Bayesian hypothesis testing. Next, we review and discuss the theoretical and empirical literature, breaking down each screen into its essential elements. We conclude by offering advice to academics designing screens, and practitioners using them: if you know what form competition (H0) and collusion (H1) are likely to take, and have a strong empirical indicator to distinguish between the two, then a screen is likely to be successful. If, however, you do not know the forms that competition and collusion are likely to take, or cannot rule out the likelihood of alternate behavior (H2), then the screen is more likely to be plagued by type I or type II errors.
We choose to ignore the problem of strategic behavior on the part of the colluders to evade a known which can be thought of as a type of deterrence. We do this not because it is not an important problem (every successful screen has this shortcoming) but rather because screening is so young. We have to know whether screening is an efficient way to detect conspiracies before we address the more difficult question of whether screens can also deter them.
Screening as a problem of inference a. Bayesian Hypothesis Testing
To study screens, we use the metaphor of statistical inference by specifying the competing hypotheses, competition (H0) vs. collusion (H1), and a variable X that can differentiate between them. Each hypothesis is related to the variable by a distribution function, : ~ 3 Alternatively, H0 can be thought of as a composite hypothesis. For example, if H2 is another competitive (non collusive) hypothesis, then the researcher tries to differentiate between H0 or H2 vs. H1.
: ~ and the problem of inference is how to determine which hypothesis generated the observable data , , … , . Each data point could be an individual observation, e.g., on price or on margin, or a vector of what Kovacic et al. (2011) call "indicator variables" or "plus factors."
Although much of our analysis could be done using the metaphor of classical hypothesis testing, we choose to work within the Bayesian framework because it can accommodate both "structural" screening, based on prior beliefs, and "behavioral" screening, based on data (Harrington, 2006) . Our goal is to compute the posterior probability of collusion given the data
To do this, we have to specify prior beliefs, and , which are informed by structural indicators such as evidence of past collusion or product homogeneity, e.g., Stigler (1964) or whether the government is the potential conspiracy victim (e.g., Froeb et al., 1993) . A "neutral" or "uninformative" prior would have a prior belief characterized by 0.5.
These assumptions imply a prior belief about the data generating process, 1 , where represents our prior assessment that the industry is competitive. After seeing the data, we construct the likelihoods of the competing hypotheses,
They tell us how likely it is that each hypothesis generated the data. As written, the likelihood equations imply that each piece of data, or each indicator variable, is independent and drawn from the same continuous distribution (iid) but this is not necessary. The likelihoods could be constructed from a vector of correlated factors, or from non-iid or discrete data. We update our prior beliefs using the likelihood ratio or "Bayes Factor," , which says that the posterior odds equals the prior odds times the likelihood ratio. The posterior belief about the data generating process is 1 where | and 1 | is the posterior probability that H0 and H1 are true. This represents our beliefs after updating them with data. The final element to the screen is a way to turn the posterior belief into action. Here we could imagine that a decision-maker (presumably a competition agency) could decide to investigate an industry further if | , which says that the probability of collusion is higher than some threshold. Some have characterized 0.5 as "preponderance of evidence" standard and =0.95 as a "beyond all reasonable doubt" standard. Alternatively, the decision maker could optimally choose to minimize an expected loss function based on the costs of enforcement errors ( , as in Froeb et al. (2006) . In this case, investigate further if expected cost of Type I error (failure to investigate when collusion is present) is greater than the expected cost of Type II error (investigation when no collusion is present), (1984) argues that the market will more readily correct false acquittals than false prosecutions, or that which would imply a higher optimal threshold for investigation. Even though few screens are characterized as a problem of inference, implicitly this is what each is trying to do. Formally classifying them in this way allows us to understand their elements, and more importantly to understand the conditions under which one would expect them to succeed or fail.
The first reason for failure is that X is what Kovacic et al. (2011) call a "weak" indicator. In this case, the likelihood ratio will be near one, and the posterior odds will be close to the prior odds. In other words, the likelihood does not help us to distinguish between the two hypotheses. In contrast, a "strong" indicator variable will have a likelihood ratio away from one, which would shift the posterior odds towards one of the two competing hypotheses.
The second reason for failure is that the null hypothesis is not indicative of competition or that the alternative is not indicative of collusion. So even if the data can tell us whether H0 or H1 is more likely to have generated the data, this doesn't tell us very much about whether collusion is present. To see how this leads to errors, imagine that H0 could be consistent with either competition or collusion, but that H1 is consistent only with collusion. If the likelihood favors the competitive hypothesis such that | , no further investigation is taken. In this case, the screen is likely to miss collusive behavior.
Conversely, imagine that H0 is consistent only with competition, but H1 is consistent with either competition or collusion. If the likelihood favors the collusive hypothesis such that | , further investigation is taken. In this case, the screen will allocate prosecutorial resources to an investigation with a low probability of finding collusion. When both H0 and H1 are consistent with both competition and collusion, the probability that the screen will commit both types of errors is high.
This mistake occurs when the theoretical models or assumptions on which the screens are based do not fit the significant features of competition in the industry being studied. If the theoretical models do not adequately characterize behavior in the industry to which the screen is being applied, or if the collusive or competitive outcomes depend on factors that cannot be observed or verified, then the screen is likely to work poorly. We refer to this problem as one of model "fit."
Some of the screens are based on instances of past collusion. For example, as discussed more fully below, Abrantes-Metz, Froeb, Geweke, and Taylor (2006) note that when a frozen fish conspiracy collapsed, the price went down by over 16%, but the standard deviation of price (over time) went up by over 200%. Using this empirical analogy, they construct a screen based on the coefficient of variation of price, and apply it to retail gasoline. However, unless collusion in the gasoline industry takes a similar form to collusion in frozen fish sold by auction to the government, then the screen is unlikely to work very well. This is the same problem of fit, but here the "fit" is to a past instance of collusion, not a theoretical model.
b. Screening vs. testing
One obvious question is what happens if neither H0 nor H1 generated the data? Our Bayesian framework can be easily modified to admit a third alternative, which we call H2:
If H2 is known, this becomes what is known as a problem of "model selection" where we choose between three alternatives. As above, we begin with a prior belief about the data generating process,
1
, which we update with the likelihood in an analogous way. If we don't know about the existence of H2, the results of the previous section still hold, i.e., we can still compute the relative odds of H0 vs. H1, but the computation of the posterior probabilities will be wrong. In this case, we will mistakenly compute
We find that this is a useful way to think about the difference between what we call testing and screening. If you are "testing" for collusion, you know that the world is either H0 or H1, but if you are "screening" for collusion you recognize that there may be other alternatives like H2. In other words, when "testing," all you have to worry about is "sampling uncertainty." With enough data, or with good enough indicator variables you can estimate the posterior probability with precision and take appropriate action. In contrast, when you are unsure about the possibility of other alternatives (H2), the posterior probability will reflect "model uncertainty" in addition to sampling uncertainty. This is closely related to the problem of model fit discussed above. If you know that the world is either H0 or H1 (and that H0 implies competition and that H1 implies collusion), with a strong enough indicator variable, you can distinguish collusion from competition. However, if the world can also be H2, then distinguishing between H0 and H1 is not likely to tell you very much about collusion or competition.
Theoretical Screens
The purpose of this section is to review some theoretical models of cartels and collusive behavior that have been used to construct screens. By reviewing the literature, we highlight the significant features of competition that each model is designed to capture, in addition to the maintained assumptions on which the models are built. We elucidate these features and assumptions for the purpose of highlighting the problem of model fit. Unless the model on which the screen is based captures the significant features of competition in the industry being screened, the screen is likely to perform poorly. The literature is summarized in Table  1 . Green and Porter (1984) show that periodic episodes of sharp drops in colluding firms' prices and profits may be indicative of cartel self-enforcement. Departing from Stigler's (1964) notion that these episodes reflect the instability of cartels, Green and Porter show instead that cartels may use price wars as a self-policing device. In their model, demand is uncertain, and colluding firms engage in collusive behavior or Cournot behavior depending on whether or not the market price is above an agreed-upon "trigger" price. The alternative hypothesis of collusion is that output levels follow a switching process triggered by drops in the market price. Green and Porter suggest that the American rail freight industry in the 1880s is an example of an industry that satisfies their assumptions on industry structure, and exhibits the kind of collusion that they model. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) analyze an infinite-horizon dynamic model with observable demand shocks in which firms compete either in Cournot or in Bertrand fashion. In their model, a colluding firm's incentive to cheat by undercutting the collusive price is greater when demand is high. They show that in periods of high demand, colluding firms are likely to behave more competitively. During these periods, the marginal benefit gained by a colluding firm from "cheating" on the cartel is greater since the share of market captured is larger. In response, the cartel reduces the collusive price to reduce the incentive to cheat. This behavior generates countercyclical price and margin movements, i.e., the collusive price and margin is lower when demand is high and higher when demand is low (H1). The competitive hypothesis (H0) of competition is that price and margins are pro-cyclical with respect to observable demand shocks. Athey Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004) develop a theory linking collusion and price rigidity. They show that if firms are sufficiently patient and the distribution of firms' costs is log-concave, then optimal symmetric collusion in equilibrium is characterized both by price rigidity and the absence of price wars. Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico analyze the equilibrium of an infinite-horizon, repeated game model in which the stage game is one of Bertrand competition among symmetric firms. Each firm possesses private information about its marginal cost of production, and cost levels are independently and identically distributed across firms. As discussed below, several empirical studies cite this paper as suggesting that price rigidity (H1) can serve as a screen of collusive behavior in an industry that satisfies their structural assumptions. Under the null hypothesis of competition (H0), price varies more closely with cost. Marshall, Marx, and Raiff (2008) analyze price announcements in the vitamins industry, with a view to detecting collusion in the industry after 1985 They model public price announcements in an industry with homogenous products and capacity constraints as a multi-period game and show that in the absence of explicit collusive behavior (H0): (i) there exist equilibria in which none of the firms makes price announcements; (ii) there exist equilibria in which the larger firm leads a joint announcement, or makes a singleton announcement -the larger firm makes an announcement in an earlier period while the smaller firm does not make an announcement but sets its price in a later period; and (iii) no equilibria exist in which the smaller firm makes a singleton announcement or leads a joint announcement. Marshall et al. observe frequent joint price announcements in the collusive post-1985 period. They also find that, relative to the pre-1985 period, announcements were made well in advance of effective dates in the collusive period. Furthermore, they observe that the timing of price announcements in the collusive period is consistent with regularly scheduled cartel meetings. For these reasons, the authors conclude that the empirical implications of their model are largely consistent with the absence of explicit collusion in the vitamins industry prior to 1985, but consistent with the presence of explicit collusion after 1985. Thus, according to Marshall et al., the model suggests collusive behavior in the vitamins industry after 1985. We describe their empirical analysis in Section 4.
There is also a literature on optimal cartel pricing when detection is a possibility. Harrington and Chen (2006) study a dynamic model of oligopoly with stochastic costs, in which a firm that forms a cartel is detected with some probability. They assume that firms have a common constant marginal cost of production and, essentially, that a firm's cost in a given period equals the sum of its cost in the previous period and a normally distributed cost shock. Further, "buyers have the maintained hypothesis that price is an affine function of cost and cost changes are normally distributed but do not know the coefficients to the pricing function or the moments of the cost distribution." Their analysis, while admittedly exploratory and relying on strong maintained assumptions, is an attempt to enrich our understanding of cartel pricing behavior. Simulating their model produces cartel price paths with a transition phase followed by a stationary phase in which collusion (H1) reduces price variation (X). The simulated cartel price paths resemble the price paths of real cartels, and they take this as an encouraging sign that their model may help develop empirical tests for cartel detection.
We take away two things from this brief review of theory. First is that these models of collusive behavior are all somewhat stylized, based on a number of assumptions that may not comport well with reality. What is important for our purposes is whether these models can capture the significant features of competition in the industries to which screens based on them are applied. This is another way of articulating the problem of "model fit." Second, there are a variety of ways to collude. The models reviewed illustrate a variety of ways that firms can fix prices, but firms can also rig bids, allocate customers, agree to shut down capacity, refrain from advertising or price discriminating, or even collude on organizational form (Shor and Chen, 2009 ) as ways to reduce competition. When using a screen based on one of these models, it is important to first figure out how competition and collusion work and whether the screen would help you distinguish one from the other.
Empirical Screens
The empirical literature on collusive screens may be categorized broadly into the following categories: (1) screens based on the first and second moments of the price distribution 4 ; (2) screens based on structural modeling; and (3) screens based on various cartel markers derived from models of firms' pricing behavior. Table 1 presents a sample of recent or significant papers that fall into these categories. We use our earlier distinction between "screens" and "tests" for collusion in that screens are designed to find unknown episodes of collusion, while tests are designed to test whether indicator variables (X) can correctly identify known or suspected episodes of collusion. Sometimes the distinction is not so clear or useful, but it is designed to capture the idea that if you know the form of the conspiracy (H1) and how it differs from competition (H0), then it should be easier to find a variable that correctly identifies the conspiracy because you are more confident that your empirical model "fits" the form of the collusion. Screens, on the other hand, are more exploratory in nature because the form of competition or collusion is not known, or because there may exist alternate hypotheses (H2) not contemplated by the screen.
A. Screens Based on First and Second Moments of Price Distribution
Empirical screens for collusive conduct have generally involved the examination of pricing patterns that might be indicative of collusion. Along these lines, the U.S. Department of Justice has identified five pricing patterns as possible indicators of explicit collusion: (1) prices remain identical for long periods of time; (2) prices start to become identical after being different previously; (3) price increases that appear not to be explained by exogenous cost increases; (4) elimination of price discounts in a market where discounts historically were given, and (5) local customers pay higher prices than more distant customers.
5 Empirical screens found in the academic literature have tended to follow this approach with much research focused on examining changes in the first and second moments of the price distribution. Below we discuss papers that are representative of this body of research. Froeb, Koyak, and Werden (1993) propose a method for estimating the price effects of bid rigging and price fixing conspiracies based on the level of prices which controls for cost differences and other factors that may be responsible for observed price differences between collusive and competitive periods. They apply their estimator to a known conspiracy involving bid rigging in the sale of frozen seafood to the Defense Personnel and Support Center ("DPSC") in Philadelphia. 7 Based on an inspection of quantity-weighted bid prices for frozen perch filets in procurements from July 10, 1984 through September 27, 1989, the authors divide their data into three distinct periods: a pre-conspiracy period characterized by relatively constant prices despite big seasonal swings in fresh fish prices, 9/19/86-7/20/88; a "transition" period during which the conspiracy collapsed characterized 6 They note that prior studies finding that profits or prices fell after antitrust enforcement action are unreliable because they ignore cost differences and other factors (see, for example, Erickson (1976) and Parker (1969) ).
by a rapid decline in the price of frozen perch while cost rose, mid July/88 to mid Sept/88; and a post-conspiracy period, 9/28/88 -9/27/89. The null hypothesis (competition) is that the price of frozen perch was not statistically lower (on average) in the post-conspiracy period than the pre-conspiracy period, 8 controlling for cost differences.
To estimate "but-for" conspiracy prices, the authors use weekly time series data in the post-conspiracy period and fit a regression model of frozen perch log price as a function of current and lagged costs, as measured by fresh perch log prices. The model is used to backcast but-for conspiracy price in two earlier periods that preceded the collapse of the bid rigging scheme. They find the price during the conspiracy period is significantly above the but-for predicted price in every auction, with an average cartel mark-up in the range of 23.1% to 30.4%, depending on the period chosen to define the conspiratorial conduct.
By examining the first and second moments from the same conspiracy collapse, Abrantes-Metz, Froeb, Geweke and Taylor ("AFG&T") (2006), propose a screen based on the standard deviation of price normalized by its mean, or the coefficient of variation. They find that while the mean price decreased by 16%, the coefficient of variation increased by 332% following the conspiracy collapse. The mean and standard deviation of the cost is also higher under competition, but not by nearly enough to account for the increase in price. Thus, the authors conclude that during the post-conspiracy period, price began to co-vary more closely with cost, and thus exhibited larger variation (over time).
Based on this finding, the authors hypothesize that other conspiracies would exhibit similar patterns, and apply their "variance screen" to retail gasoline stations in Louisville, KY in 1996 -2002 . The Louisville area is considered a good candidate for collusion because gasoline in Kentucky at both wholesale and retail is moderately concentrated and uses a unique formation of gasoline, i.e., reformulated gasoline. They note that while a cartel the size of a city would be costly to organize and police, there may be a degree of market power conferred by the elimination of localized competition. The variance screen would identify a potential cartel as a cluster of gasoline stations located close to one another exhibiting lower price variation and higher prices relative to other stations in the city. They find no such clusters and conclude competitive conduct is a more plausible explanation than collusion.
In contrast, Bolotova, Connor, and Miller (2008) find mixed evidence that price variance during collusion is lower compared to that observed prior to the formation of a cartel. The study considers two well-documented episodes of collusion: the lysine cartel (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) and the citric acid cartel (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) . They hypothesize that the mean price is higher and the variance of the price is lower during collusive relative to non-collusive periods. Using monthly average contract citric acid prices and average monthly lysine prices, their statistical analysis is based on extensions of the traditional autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity ("ARCH") and generalized ARCH models. They find that mean prices are higher in both cartels during the collusive period. However, they find price variance is lower during the lysine cartel, but higher during the citric acid conspiracy than it was during more competitive periods. The authors suggest that foreign competition might account for this outcome. They conclude that the variance screen may be a useful tool to detect conspiracies that do not significantly raise price but tend to homogenize business practices, which may raise profits and also reduce variance.
Abrantes-Metz, Kraten, Metz & Seow (2012) Their screening methodology propose three tests for collusion. First, they examine the relationship between Libor and other major benchmarks, assuming those to be nonmanipulated at the time they are used as benchmarks. Specifically, they test whether the Libor rate is manipulated downward during Period 2, relative to Periods 1 or 3. They cannot reject the null hypothesis that Libor rates are from the same as the predicted rate. Thus, they conclude that the evidence on the average level of the Libor rate is consistent with the absence of a material manipulation.
The authors also examine the pattern of individual Libor quotes by 16 participating banks. In particular, they examine how likely it is it that a large number of banks will submit identical Libor quotes without coordinating. To that end, they first examine the intra-day variance of these individual quotes. They also calculate the frequency with which each bank appears in the "deciding group" 9 , and identify banks that tend to be in the deciding group most often. They hypothesize that ''manipulative'' banks should cluster together in non-random patterns. To test this, the authors compute pairwise correlations between all possible bank-pairs and calculate the frequency with which each bank appears in the deciding group, and identify a group of banks that tend to be in the deciding group very often. From this analysis, the null hypothesis of nonrandom clustering patterns is rejected, raising the possibility of manipulation. The third collusion test follows from an analysis of the relationships between individual Libor quotes and proxies for individual borrowing costs as determined by CDS spreads. In particular, they examine whether banks with relatively low CDS spreads are also banks with relatively low Libor quotes. They detect several banks whose ordinal positions in Libor quotes are unrelated to their ordinal positions in CDS spreads, and raise the possibility of manipulation.
Abrantes-Metz and Adanki (2007) propose a variance (over time) screen to detect manipulation of commodity prices based on an analysis of the Hunt Brothers' silver manipulation episode of 1979-80. Their screen is based on the notion that manipulation provides an informational advantage to manipulators over the rest of the market (i.e., market participants are fooled). This implies that when market participants form expectations on the likely levels of future prices, these forecasts are systematically wrong more often than they would otherwise have been in the absence of manipulation. Thus, the variable of interest is the variance in the forecasting error of future spot prices. If the collusion is effective in reducing prices, this will result in more negative forecast errors.
Using daily futures and spot prices for silver from Comex from February 1975 through April 2004, their analysis examines the relationship between the futures contract price at maturity date T and the realized spot price on that date. They find that the coefficient of variation of the forecast errors is larger during the manipulation period, and that this result holds when regression analysis is used to control for changes in macroeconomic conditions. Abrantes-Metz and Metz (2012) attempt to determine how far screens can go in distinguishing explicit from tacit collusion. In doing so, they consider evidence from the Libor setting. Their purpose is to determine whether movements in Libor rates are best explained by noncooperative behavior, tacit collusion, or explicit collusion. Their analysis is based on an inspection of the coefficient of variation (across banks) in daily Libor quotes for 9 Libor is established as the simple average of the middle set of eight quotes that are submitted by the sixteen participating banks. These eight banks comprise the "deciding group." a cross section of 16 participating banks. They find that the coefficient of variation is near zero from early August 2006 through early August 2007, becoming abruptly positive thereafter. They note that if all banks were submitting unique quotes each day (which happened to average to the same level day after day), the coefficient of variation would be larger. On the other hand, if all banks submitted essentially the same quote, the coefficient of variation would be low, and if the middle eight quotes were identical, it would be zero.
Their test for noncooperative behavior is whether the observed convergence across Libor quotes from the 16 participating banks is explained by identical borrowing costs. If so, they note that the triggering of the financial crisis would have affected all banks equally. Since the banks considered differ significantly in terms of their characteristics and borrowing costs (i.e., they have asset portfolios of varying risk, varying liability structures, and participate to different degrees in different market segments), they reject the noncooperative hypothesis.
To distinguish between tacit and explicit collusion, the hypothesis is that the data would be more consistent with tacit collusion if banks were "learning" from the strategic reaction of the other banks. In this setting, a transition period would be observed in which the variation of intraday quotes would be decreasing towards zero. Since an abrupt transition to zero is observed, they conclude the data are inconsistent with tacit collusion. The authors note that the tacit collusion hypothesis is further complicated by the fact that individual bank quotes are sealed and are made public only after the Libor is computed. Thus, if the banks submit the same quote day after day, and other banks were learning and converging toward that common quote, the data may be described as consistent with tacit collusion. On the other hand, if many banks submit a common sealed quote one day, and a common but different sealed quote the next day, tacit collusion is a less likely explanation. Based on an inspection of individual bank quotes, they conclude that the tacit collusion (or learning theory) hypothesis does not fit the data well, leaving explicit collusion as the explanation that is most consistent with the observed Libor quotes.
Eruthku and Hildebrand (2010) employ a differences-in-differences approach to determine whether a public announcement of an antitrust investigation (which trigged the collapse of a cartel) may be used to detect a price-fixing conspiracy. In May 2006, the Canadian Competition Bureau publically announced its investigation of retail gasoline markets in some local markets in Quebec. The authors test for collusion is whether retail prices fell following the announcement. The study employs weekly retail and wholesale prices for the period May 31, 2005 -May 22, 2007, providing 52 weeks of data before and after the announcement. In a difference-in-difference regression analysis, Sherbrook is the "treatment" city and Montreal and Quebec City are "control" cities. They find that the announcement decreased the price differential between Sherbrook and Montreal by 1.75 cents per liter. This reduction is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Interestingly, the authors find that the variance of retail prices for all cities in their sample increased after the announcement, but not significantly so.
Jiménez and Perdiguero (2012) apply a price variance (over time) screen to the retail gasoline market in the Canary Islands, Spain. The Canary Islands were selected because retail gasoline markets on different islands have different market structures. On some islands the markets have more than one supplier, while each of the remaining two islands is monopolized by a single supplier, the DISA company. The authors find that the coefficient of variation of the companies on oligopolistic islands is between 1.06% and 8% higher in the oligopolistic islands. From this, they conclude that a monopolistic firm follows a more rigid price path than do retail outlets on the oligopolistic islands. However, we note that the null hypothesis that the difference in means between the two groups is zero is not rejected using a 95% level of significance. The authors conclude that analyzing the results of the variance screen without comparing them to a benchmark would not enable them to draw any definitive conclusions. Note also that the use of the monopoly islands as a collusive benchmark (H1) may not be a good metaphor for kind of price rigidity that might occur when multiple firms try to coordinate pricing.
The authors also employ a screen to try to find pockets of retailers with higher prices and lower coefficients of variation, similar to the screen used by AFG&T (2006) . Their competitive benchmark is a retail gasoline supplier that traditionally competes more aggressively on price: PCAN. The study tests whether PCAN stimulates competition using two different approaches. The first involved examining prices and the coefficient of variation for prices in towns with and without PCAN gas stations. They find prices are always higher and the coefficient of variation smaller if PCAN is not present. The second test is whether the presence of an independent retailer within a half-mile radius is correlated to lower and more variable gasoline prices. They find both. Based on the variance screens, they conclude that the average performance of the gas retail outlets (excluding those run by PCAN) is very close to that shown on a monopolistic island, and further from CPAN. Genesove and Mullin (2001) review the rules of the Sugar Institute and meetings/notes among its members. The trade association was formed in December 1927 following several years of declining margins and excess capacity. The trade association's 14 members comprised nearly all the cane sugar refining capacity in the U.S. The cartel did not directly fix output or set prices but instead homogenized business practices, thereby facilitating members' ability to detect secret price cuts. The study is based on the average weekly prices of refined sugar and its primary input cost, raw sugar, in the U.S. from . Using these data, the authors calculate the yearly price-cost margin for sugar refining in the U.S. for three periods: before, during, and after the cartel period. The authors use a Lerner Index equal to 11% as a benchmark for monopoly pricing. This was the margin in 1892 when U.S. domestic refiners share and margin reached their highest level. The authors' hypothesis is that price-cost margins are higher and the variance of margin lower in collusive period than competition. The authors find that the conspiracy raised price-cost margins to about 75% of the monopoly level and the variance in this margin dropped by nearly 100% while the cartel remained active.
As noted above, the use of variance screens has become rather widespread in empirical work. For example, Brannon (2003) summarizes research performed for the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress on the effects of resale price maintenance laws on petrol prices and station attrition in Wisconsin. The study concluded that, "the State of Wisconsin enacted a policy that implicitly taxes its citizens for the benefit not just of small independent stations but also for the large multinational oil companies that operate in Wisconsin." The article calculates the average margin and the variance for two markets that were affected by this legislation, as well as a control group market. The results show that the average margin was higher in the collusive markets, while the findings as regards to variance were not particularly conclusive. In another example, Abrantes-Metz and Pereira (2007) analyzed the mobile phone sector in Portugal before and after the entry of a new operator, Optimus.
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B. Screens Based on Structural Models
Christie and Schultz (1994) provide evidence to show that in 1991, NASDAQ dealers avoided odd-eighth quotes for 70 of 100 large, actively traded NASDAQ securities, including Apple Computer and Lotus development. The avoidance of odd-eighth quotes ensured an inside spread of at least $0.25 for these securities. The authors compare the dollar spreads for the NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX stocks and find a systematic difference in the frequency of odd-eighth spreads in the two pools. For example, odd-eighth spreads of $0.125 and $0.375 occur nearly three times as often for NYSE/AMEX securities than for NASDAQ securities, where the spreads are mostly in even-eighths, such as $0.25, $0.50, and $0.75. The authors test which of three hypotheses best explains this odd-eighth avoidance: (i) coarse pricing increments to lower negotiation costs, (ii) cost determinants of the spread, and (iii) tacit collusion among dealers.
Finding that, in the data, larger trades are far more likely to occur on odd-eighth spreads than smaller trades, the authors rule out the first hypothesis of negotiation costs. Next, the authors use logistic regression analysis to determine that economic determinants such as volume, volatility, market capitalization, and stock price do not play a role in predicting the probability that stocks are quoted using odd eighths. By elimination, the authors conclude that the only remaining hypothesis explaining the absence of odd-eighth spreads for NASDAQ securities is tacit collusion among market makers. Bresnahan (1987) attempts to explain a dramatic increase in U.S. automobile production that occurred in 1955. In 1955, relative to the two surrounding years, automobile production was higher by 45% and quality-adjusted prices lower. The paper tests the hypothesis that there was a supply shock of a specific form: a one-year increase in the competitiveness of conduct in the industry. A structural model of supply and demand is estimated to test the fit of various firm behavioral hypotheses. Nonnested (Cox) hypothesis tests find that the collusive outcome fits the data best in 1954 and in 1956, while the competitive outcome fits the data best in 1955. Bresnahan's paper is regarded as one of the few empirical studies finding evidence of tacit collusion.
Rapson (2009) attempts to replicate the findings from Bresnahan's 1987 study to determine whether the conclusion of tacit collusion hinged on restrictive assumptions about demand. In particular, he examines the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption ("IIA") which makes demand a function only of the price and quality of adjacent models on the quality spectrum, rendering non-adjacent price changes irrelevant to predicted demand. Rapson notes that the restrictive demand specification could cause intra-firm pricing strategies consistent with differentiated product Bertrand to be mistakenly interpreted as collusion. To allow for more realistic demand behavior, he employs a random coefficients logit model. He finds that for no year can Bertrand competition be rejected in favor of tacit collusion. However, his results also indicate that firms were not maximizing profit during this period. He concludes that a firm-competition model is rejected in favor of brand competition in 1955, and is a better fit (though insignificantly) in 1954 and 1956. Structural models have also been developed to analyze bidder collusion in auctions. In an early paper commenting on the paucity (at the time) of economic literature on the subject of collusion in auctions, Hendricks and Porter (1989) pointed out that the characteristics of a collusive scheme in an auction depend on the rules of the auction and the nature of auctioned object. They also expressed surprise that the empirical literature on collusion in auctions was lacking even as detailed data sets were publicly available. Porter and Zona (1993) develop an econometric test to detect "phantom bidding" in procurement auctions, based on the differences in bidding between cartel members and nonmembers. Their test exploits information on who was and was not in the cartel, and the form of the conspiracy (cartel members used phantom bidding). Using procurement auction data from the New York State Department of Transportation ("DOT"), Porter and Zona apply their test to Nassau and Suffolk county DOT contract lettings from 1979-1985, and find that the behavior of the collusive firms -one convicted in federal court of bid rigging and four unindicted coconspirators -was statistically different from that firms that did not belong to cartel.
In a related paper, Porter and Zona (1999) develop a test to detect bid rigging in school milk procurement auctions. They list several characteristics of the school milk procurement market that facilitate their analysis: an auction design that was well understood, a relatively homogenous product, a fixed set of potential bidders in the short run, and a straightforward production process. In 1994, the state of Ohio charged thirteen dairies with bid rigging in school milk procurement auctions from 1980 to 1990. They compare the bidding behavior of three defendant firms to that of non-defendant firms and find that each defendant firm's bidding function is statistically different from the bidding functions of non-defendant firms. Porter and Zona also estimate the increase in price resulting from the collusion. They determine that bid rigging resulted in a 6.5% increase in the price of milk paid by the school districts. Bajari and Ye (2003) develop a screen to detect bidder collusion in procurement auctions where bidders are asymmetric with respect to their ex-ante costs. They posit two conditions that are necessary and sufficient for competition in their model: conditional independence and exchangeability. Under conditional independence, bids are independent after controlling for publicly observable cost information. Exchangeability implies that only costs, not the identities of other bidders, determine how a firm bids. Thus, Bajari and Ye's null hypothesis of competition is that bids satisfy both conditional independence and exchangeability. Bajari and Ye apply their screen to the market for asphalt contracts in the 1994-1998 period, a market with a known history of collusion in the 1980's. They identify two pairs of firms that fail both the conditional independence and exchangeability tests. Next, they use a Bayesian framework to choose among three alternative models of industry equilibrium: (1) competitive bidding by all firms, (2) collusive bidding by the first pair and competitive bidding by all other firms, and (3) collusive bidding by the second pair and competitive bidding by all other firms. They find that the posterior probability of the competitive model is the highest, and conclude that the bidding in the market is competitive. Marshall, Marx, and Raiff (2008) perform an empirical analysis to determine whether the timing of price announcements (X) after 1985 in the vitamins industry is the result of collusion rather than as the result of demand and cost phenomena (H0). They construct a dataset comprising the dates and number of public price announcements in the United States during the time period 1970-2001 for ten vitamin products. The authors estimate a logit model for the probability that firms announce a price change in a given month as a function of the number of months elapsed since the previous announced price change, and demand and supply effects. The estimated coefficients of the logit regression show that for the two time periods prior to 1985, the time elapsed from the previous announcement does not have a significant effect on the probability of a new price announcement. However, the time elapsed from the previous announcement has a significant effect on the probability of a new price announcement for the two periods after 1985. Among demand and supply factors, the only variable with a significant coefficient for any time period is the exchange-rate, with a significant coefficient in the first time period after 1985. The authors interpret the results of the logit regression as implying that after 1985, the timing of public price announcements is tied to the timing of cartel meetings. Marshall et al. conclude that the probability of new price announcements provides a potentially valuable tool for the identification of explicit collusion. The alternative hypothesis of collusion (H1) is that there is a much higher probability of price announcements (X) relative to a "clean" period.
C. Screens Based on Collusive Markers other than Price Screens
Collusive markers other than price have been have been used to try to detect cartels. Economic theory predicts that certain industry characteristics manifest differently under the presence of collusive behavior than under that of competitive behavior. These characteristics have to do with industry processes such as market clearing, technological innovation, rate of return, and product innovation among others.
11 The outcomes of these processes are different under competitive and collusive behavior, and, thus, serve as a means to detect cartels.
Blanckenberg and Geist (2009) postulate these six markers as a tool for testing the "workability of markets." These markers are (i) utilization rate of capacities, (ii) correlation between the utilization rate of capacities and price changes, (iii) difference between the rate of return in the industry to a broader comparison rate of return, (iv) correlation between the rate of return difference and capacity growth rate changes, (v) variance of price changes, and (vi) variance of capacity growth rate changes. Table 2 shows the null and alternative hypotheses associated with these markers. While they admit that cartel formation is only one of many reasons for the non-workability of markets, they suggest that the system of collusive markers can be used by antitrust authorities as an aid in the detection of long-term cartels. They also apply their screen as an empirical test using annual time-series data on five German industries from 1980-2007. Among the five German industries they consider is the German cement industry which is known to have had a cartel that lasted from 1981 to 2002. The other four industry serve as competitive benchmarks. Blanckenberg and Geist's system of markers correctly identifies the cement industry as collusive and the others as competitive.
Conclusion
Collusion screens (and tests) have been used in an informal way to help determine how to allocate scarce prosecutorial resources. As such, some might object to our formal characterization of screens by analogy to Bayesian hypothesis testing. But all screens are designed to help us make better decisions, so understanding exactly how they do this allows us to reduce a collusion screen to its essential elements. We can compare and contrast the growing number of screens that have been proposed by academics or used by practitioners. in Table 3 .
Formally modeling screening also allows us to better understand the conditions under which screens are likely to fail. The first is that the empirical indicator may not be able to differentiate between competition (H0) and collusion (H1). The second is that the null hypothesis is not indicative of competition or that the alternative is not indicative of collusion. The third is that the world is neither H0 nor H1. The second and third, often under-appreciated reasons for failure, are due to what we call the problem of "model fit": the screen is based on assumptions that do not fit the industry to which the screen is being applied.
This criticism is similar to that leveled against the use of structural oligopoly models for merger screening (Froeb et al., 2004) . Before a structural model is used to predict whether mergers will raise price, enforcers should make sure that the model is able to characterize the significant features of observed competition within the industry. The analogy to criticism of the use of structural models for collusion screening is obvious.
Less obvious is the analogy to screens based on indicator variables chosen from past episodes of collusion. Here the assumption on which the screen is based is that the industry being screened exhibits collusive and competitive behavior similar to that of the industry in which collusion occurred. Before the screen is used, practitioners should make sure that the industry "fits" this often implicit assumption.
As a final note of caution, it is important to remember that all models, both theoretical and empirical, are abstractions away from reality. This means that one can always find some feature of the industry being screened that is at odds with the model assumptions. But the art of model building is to determine whether this omission is likely to bias the screen's predictions, or whether the screen works well despite the omission. Green & Porter (1984) Maintain cartel outputs given imperfect information about demand.
(1) Firms choose outputs; (2) market prices depends on market output and the realization of an unobserved demand shock; (3) firms choose outputs before the realization of the demand shock; infinite time horizon
Firms each choose a set cartel outputs unless market price falls below an agreed "trigger" level; at that point each firms reverts to its Cournot output given its expectations about the demand shock
Output level: Output follows a switching process triggered by a low market price. Rotemberg & Saloner (1986) Cartel pricing with observable demand shocks which are iid over time.
(1) Firms can be either Cournot or Bertrand; (2) market demand curve depends on prices (outputs) and the realization of an observable demand shock.
Cartel prices are chosen to make it unprofitable to defect from them, given the known state of demand and expectations about the future.
Price level: Cartel prices are counter-cyclical: when current demand is high relative to expected future demand, the temptation to cheat is greatest, meaning that cartel prices must fall to deter cheating; and vice versa when current demand is low.
Optimal cartel pricing when detection is a possibility
(1) Firms have identical marginal cost, (2) cost is a specific stochastic process, (1) Predictions generated by a benchmark model of price announcements; (2) the price announcement model assumes fixed capacities and homogeneous products;(2) the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game involves a price leader(the largest firm) announcing price change before smaller firms; (3) under collusion, firms pre-announce price increases to convince strategic buyers that the price increases reflect general cost increases, and that strategic buying will not be profitable; (4) absent collusion, individual sellers do not have this concern, and do not preannounce price changes.
(1) In cases of known collusion, did the pattern of price announcements differ from in the same industry during noncollusive period? (2) advance announcements of price change under collusion should be public, rather than private; (3) price announcements should come just before existing contracts are renewed, so as to convince a strategic buyer that there is no reason to switch sellers; they should not reflect cost or demand changes, but rather the length of time since the most recent expiration date of a contract between a cartel seller and its customer.
(1) Likelihood of price announcements: The likelihood of price announcements does not depend on costs of demand, but on the length of time since the last set of price announcements. (2) Frequency of price announcements: The frequency of price announcements increases greatly relative to a "clean" period. Athey, Bagwell & Sanchirrico (2004) Can a cartel subject to costs shocks display rigid pricing, in accordance with much collusion folklore?
(1) Bertrand stage game, in which the low priced firm(s) get all the business; (2) each firm gets an i.i.d. cost shock each period, which is private information; (3) each firm has identical beliefs about future cost shocks; (4) each firm reports its current period cost value to the cartel, along with the price implied by that cost; (5) each firm can credibly pre-commit to this price mechanism; (6) transfers are possible between cartel members; (7) each firm maximizes expected present value over infinite time horizon; (8) sequential equilibrium concept for cartel.
Result is that cartel pricing will display rigidity if cartel firms are patient enough and if the distribution function of future cost shocks is log-concave. Would need to test for these, which would be difficult. If one could verify these conditions then Ho is that the stage game is Bertrand and H1 is that you would never see sticky prices. If you did, this rules out the stage game, implying collusion. For a given firm and project, the ratio of the amount bid by the firm on the project to the engineer's cost estimate for the project.
Detailed bidding information for almost all the public and private road construction projects conducted in Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota during the years 1994-1998. Dataset contains nearly 18,000 procurement auctions.
Among 23 pairs with at least 4 simultaneous bids, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected expect for four pairs of firms. In only one pair did bidders bid against each other more than a handful of times. Screen Bids are exchangeable: costs alone should determine how firms bid. Holding cost information constant, a firm's bid shouldn't depend on the identities of its competitors.
Bids are not exchangeable. For a given firm and project, the ratio of the amount bid by the firm on the project to the engineer's cost estimate for the project.
Only one pair (different from the four above) fails the exchangeability test. Also, the bidders in the pair bid against each other more than a handful of times. Screen
After identifying pairs of firms whose bidding patterns are not consistent with competitive bidding using conditional independence and exchangeability tests, estimate alternative structural models in which a particular indentified pair colludes and all other firms compete. Calculate posterior probability of collusion using estimated models. Investigate if probability of collusion is large.
Probability of collusion is low
Firm's private cost (estimated), used to calculate marginal likelihood of each model, in turn used to calculate posterior probabilities that equilibrium model is competitive/collusive Pair 1 failing C.I. and pair 2 failing exch were models 2 and 3, model 1 was competition. Posterior probability of competitive model is highest. Erutku & Hilderbrand. (2010) 
Screen
Canadian Competition Bureau investigation of retail gasoline pricing in Sherbrook, Canada.
Post investigation announcement decline in retail gasoline pricing.
Weekly retail gasoline pricing. Difference-in-Difference regression model using prices in 3 cities: Sherbrook, Montreal, and Quebec.
Weekly data in cities during period 5/31/05-5/22/07. 52 weeks before and after announcement
Announcement of conspiracy triggered a 1.75 cents per litre decline in prices.
Cost control is wholesale gasoline price. Stiglerian theory of collusion leads to ambiguous conclusion regarding likely collusion in Sherbrook. 
